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BEYOND THE PROMISES: RESUSCITATING THE
STATE REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS
Takele Soboka Bulto*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is said that greater than a mighty army is an idea whose time has
come. In Africa, as elsewhere, the principle of domestic jurisdiction over
human rights has given way to international monitoring of domestic implementation of human rights. Infractions of basic human rights are no longer
matters of exclusive internal concern, just as sovereignty is no longer an
acceptable defense to deprivation of fundamental rights of nationals and
other residents of a country.
However, the recognition of these rights in an international instrument like the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights' (the Charter)
without an adequate monitoring and enforcement mechanism, does not augur well for effective protection of human rights in Africa. The two main
mechanisms provided for under the Charter are the complaints system and
the reporting procedure. The former deals with interstate complaints and
individual complaints procedures. The aim of the complaints system is
confined to addressing the violation(s) complained of in a case, and, as
such, the system cannot ensure full overview and control of the implementation of the Charter's provisions. It cannot give a true picture of the human
rights record of a given state. Additionally, it has been of minimal use as
there has been only one interstate complaint so far.
The state reporting procedure, however, can be used to gauge general compliance with the whole gamut of rights, freedoms and duties guaranteed under the Charter. The main objective underlying the reporting
mechanism is to produce state compliance with their obligations under the
*

Legal Officer, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, Banjul,

The Gambia; M.A., Addis Ababa, 2005; LL.M., Pretoria, 2003; LL.B., Addis
Ababa, 1999. In gratitude for the illuminating comments of Professor E.V.O.
Dankwa, Former Chairperson and Commissioner of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights, on the earlier version of this work. Any errors or
omissions are those of the author.
1 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, 21
I.L.M. 58 (June 27, 1981), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter the
Charter].
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instrument in question. It also aims at cultivating a domestic human rights
culture. Ideally, reporting is considered an "integral part of a continuing
process designed to promote and enhance respect for human rights rather
than as an isolated event absorbing precious bureaucratic resources solely to
2
satisfy the requirements of an international treaty."
Non-adversarial as it is, reporting aims at establishing a constructive dialogue between the states and the treaty monitoring body concerned
with persuading states to implement their human rights obligations. It "is a
means of ensuring the observance of human rights at the international level
as well as ensuring government's accountability to its own people and the
international community." 3 Reporting offers an opportunity for domestic
assessment and for the adoption of measures to remedy any shortcomings
which have been identified. It is also a chance to proclaim to the international community that the government concerned is serious about its international commitments. In this context, state reporting aims at inwardlooking as well as outward-looking objectives, termed introspectionand in4
spection, respectively.
The process of introspection and inspection will lead, in the end, to
an increased awareness of human rights issues among government departments, the public and other state and non-state actors. The preparation of
reports involves wide-ranging consultation among government departments
and civil society in a dialogue on the status of domestic human rights. The
effect of this dialogue will ultimately be reflected in legislation, policies
and actions. As a result, reporting can be a means to develop human rights
language in the implementation discourse, and to promote a basic understanding of the content and meaning of the commitments undertaken by
states.
Moreover, state reports are examined by domestic and international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the monitoring body, and perhaps
even media coverage. The consequent praise and criticism associated with
public exposure may make it easier for the state to internalize the instrument. Constructive dialogue between the state's delegation and the monitoring body will promote respect and understanding of human rights within
2

Philip Alston, The Purposes of Reporting, in

PORTING,

MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS RE-

19, 20 (1997).

Kofi Quashigah, The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Towards a More Effective Rreporting Mechanism, 2 AFRICAN HUM. RTs. L.J. 261
(2002).
4 Frans Viljoen, The Realisation of Human Rights in Africa through Inter-Governmental Institutions 235 (1998) (unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of Pretoria) (on file with the University of Pretoria).
3
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the reporting state. This process of examination, along with concluding observations that may follow, will further the human rights objectives mentioned above.
Thus, reporting may prove to be an invaluable catalyst for creating
a universally recognized human rights language and way of thinking. Because state parties to the Charter are equally subjected to examination, there
will be less resistance to supervision. Because of its cyclical nature, it creates an avenue for continuous supervision and dialogue. In effect, reporting
''may prove to be an effective means to develop a universal culture of
rights, one in which the actual meaning of rights and their implementations
for specific individuals and groups are commonly understood and internal' 5
ized by governments and civil society alike.
In this respect, the success of the reporting procedure can be determined by the "extent to which treaty norms have been made part of the
general culture of individual countries, for example through coverage in the
media or educational programmes. '6 Thus, an effective reporting system
contributes to the general culture of respect for human rights.
However, the efficacy of this procedure under the Charter has long
been questioned, and it is generally agreed that the system has not been
effective. Scholars are currently engaged in identifying both the reasons
why the state reporting mechanism has failed and the possible solutions to
this problem. It is the purpose of this work to contribute to that inquiry.
Having introduced the subject and the problems pertaining thereto
in Part I above, Part II of this work analyzes the legal framework of the
reporting procedure and problems pertaining thereto under the Charter. In
Part III, the law and the practice of reporting in Africa will be contrasted
and critically analyzed. Finally, Part IV will complete the study by presenting conclusions on this topic.
II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Charter has been ratified by all member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). The rights and
duties enshrined in the Charter are applicable to each and every member
state. 7 The Charter derives its binding force, inter alia, from Article 1 in
5

Judith Karp, Reporting and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in

HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37
6
Christoph H. Heyns & Frans J. Viljoen, The

THE

(Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
Impact of the United Nations

Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 485 (2001).

Mali and Eritrea were the first and the last states to ratify the Charter on Dec.
21, 1981 and Jan. 14, 1999 respectively. Niger's ratification of the Charter on July
15, 1986 enabled the attainment of the simple majority required under Art. 63(3) of
7
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which member states "recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined
in this Charter and ...

adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to

them."8

The state reporting procedure under Article 62 of the Charter is a
mechanism for monitoring state compliance with their Article 1 obligation. 9
ILA

Scope of the Obligation Under the Charter

Article 62 of the Charter mandates states to submit biennial reports
"on legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the
rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the present Charter." 10
But the wording of the provision in Article 62 imposes a limitation on the
scope of the reporting obligation - it is clearly silent on duties. While state
parties have undertaken under Article 1 to recognize and to adopt legislative
and other measures to give effect to "rights, duties and freedoms" enshrined
in the Charter, Article 62 omits "duties" from the scope of the reporting
obligation. This exclusion, however, has not absolved, in practice, the
states from reporting on "duties" as the African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights (Commission) has required states to report on "individuals'
duties." 1'
While the United Nations (UN) instruments require states simply to
report on "measures" 12 in general, Article 62 of the Charter requires states
to "submit a report ... on the legislative and other measures."' 3 The word-

ing of this provision seems to over-emphasize the legislative measures
taken by a state as opposed to other practical measures that need to be taken
to implement the Charter's rights and freedoms. Some argue that the lack,
in most African states at the time of the adoption of the Charter, of the
the Charter to bring it into force. The Charter came into force on Oct. 21, 1986 and
the day is now commemorated as Africa's Human Rights Day.
8
The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 1.
9

The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 62.

10

Id.

l1 See Guidelines for National Periodic Reports under the African Charter, at 1(b),
IV(4)-(6), reproduced in Second Annual Activity Report 45-70 (1988-89), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr docs/african/docs/achpr/achpr4.doc [hereinafter
Guidelines for National Periodic Reports].
12 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art. 40, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at art.
16, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966) [hereinafter ICESCR].
13
The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 62.
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necessary legislation to ensure the recognized rights and freedoms justifies
the approach. 14 But the wisdom of this practice should be questioned.
Undeniably, the incidence of human rights violations has been so
rampant in almost all states in Africa, both today and certainly at the time of
the adoption of the Charter, 15 that it casts doubt on the validity of the conclusion that the urgency of reporting on legislative measures deservedly
took precedence over the practice on the ground. Even when this conclusion is conceded, it faces serious criticism.
The requirement of submission of state reports on "legislative and
other measures ... gives one the impression that a greater emphasis is being

placed in the African system on legislative measures adopted than anything
else. ' 16 Thus, "Article 62 of the African Charter must have accounted
partly for the unsatisfactory nature of the early reports submitted to the
African Commission. ' 17 In the UN system the word "measures" has been
preferred to the more specific formulation of "legislative measures" due to
the former's ability to "afford State parties greater freedom to report on the
entire range of laws and practices ensuring compliance [with the treaty concerned]." 18 Alternatively, Article 62 should have simultaneously provided
for reporting on legislative measures and practical implementation of the
rights and freedoms contained in the Charter.
Notably, as stated in the Guidelines for National Periodic Reports
under the African Charter 19 (Guidelines), the Commission is of the conviction that "implementation of [the Charter] by word and deed, is of parallel
significance and is equally needed. '20 Accordingly, the Guidelines seem to
be in variance, if not in disagreement, with the more restrictive manner in
which Article 62 is formulated. In the Guidelines, state reports "'should
show not only the achievements made on the statute book but should also
lucidly reveal the extent of implementation in terms of how far the rights
and fundamental freedoms of the Charter are being fulfilled and how far the
21
duties are being successfully carried out."
Furthermore, Article 62 only contains the obligation of a state party
to submit a report, but it neither stipulates to which authority or body those
14 Michelo K. Hansungule, State Reporting in Africa: An Overview 4 (2003) (unpublished) (on file with author).

15 Mention can be made of the Mengistu, Barre, Doe, Mobutu and Moi regimes.
Quashigah, supra note 3, at 274.

16
17

Id.

18

Id.

19 Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, supra note 11.
20 Id.
1.
21

Id.
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reports should be sent, nor specifically authorizes the Commission to examine the reports. Thus one might ask: Must the reports be examined?
And if so, by whom? Once examined, what action should be taken, if any?
In sharp contrast to the Charter, Article 40(4) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights22 (ICCPR) explicitly entrusts the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) with the authority of receiving and examining
state reports and issuing general comments, otherwise known as concluding
23
observations.
It has been argued that the omission in the Charter was deliberate
"so as not to jeopardise ratification. ' 24 However, it
created the possibility that a body composed of either independent experts, such as the African Commission, or government representatives, such as the Organisation of
African Unity Assembly of Heads of State and Government
[Assembly].

.

. or the Council of Ministers . . . could be

mandated to receive and examine state reports. Allowing a
"political" body lacking independence, impartiality and
human rights virtuosity to review reports would have un25
dermined the benefits of state reporting.
Prompted by this conviction, the Commission at its third session
adopted a resolution requesting the Assembly to entrust it with the task of
reviewing state reports. 26 The Commission found it "difficult to see which
other organ of the OAU could accomplish this work," 27 and concluded that
it was "the only appropriate organ of the OAU ' 28 capable of both receiving
and examining the reports.
ICCPR, supra note 12.
Id. at art. 40(4).
24 Frans Viljoen, Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights: 21 October 1986 to I January 1997, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA
1997 47, 56 (C. Heyns ed. 1999).
25 George William Mugwanya, Examinations of State Reports by the African
Commission: A Critical Appraisal, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 268, 271-72 (2001).
22

23

26

KoFI QUASHIGAH, CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN

AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS:

TOWARDS A MORE EFFECTIVE REPORTING MECHANISM

18 (April 2002), available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-publications/occ-papers/occl3.html.
27 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Recommendation on Peri-

odic Reports,

1, ACHPR/Recom.3(IIH)88 (1988), available at http://www.chr.up.

ac.za/hrdocs/african/docs/achpr/achprl0.doc.
28 Id.
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Following the Commission's request, the Assembly authorized the
Commission to examine state reports and to give the state parties general
guidelines on the form and the content of the periodic reports. But the
Assembly gave the Commission as much power as the Commission requested - nothing more, and nothing less. Unfortunately, the Commission
did not request the Assembly to give it the authority to issue concluding
observations and, as such, the Assembly did not give it the power to do so.
The Commission has therefore been without explicit power to issue
concluding observations and it cannot issue any comments in relation to a
reporting state's progress in the domestic implementation of the Charter's
provisions. In effect, in terms of OAU authorization and Article 62, the
Commission lacks the necessary capacity to appreciate the progress and advise the reporting states on how to improve any weaknesses revealed in the
course of the examination process. However, the Commission rightfully
provided for the procedure by which it would be able to make "general
comments" 29 and "transmit[ them] to the reporting state."30
Nevertheless, the Commission's request for authorization to examine state reports and issue guidelines on the form and contents of the
reports is legally justifiable and functionally appropriate. Legally, examination of state reports falls within the Commission's promotional and protective mandate. 1 More specifically, Article 45(4) of the Charter empowers
the Assembly to entrust to the Commission "any other tasks" not specifically mentioned within the Commission's explicit powers. 32 Functionally,
the prevailing experience from the time of the drafting of the Charter to date
shows that reports are considered either by a body of independent experts or
by government representatives. The propriety of the Assembly's decision
to authorize the Commission with the task of examining state reports cannot
33
be questioned due to the latter's legal independence.
The Charter's failure to require states to report on their progress
made since the ratification of the Charter or after the submission of the
preceding report, is another striking feature and weakness of the Charter.
Although states are not prevented from stating the progress achieved in
their reports, they are not required to do so. This was so "perhaps because
it was realized that it would take long before witnessing progress in the

32

Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, supra note 11, at 1(8)(b).
Id.
The Charter, supra note 1, at arts. 30, 45.
Id. at art. 45(4).

33

See id. at art. 31(2).

29
30
31
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enjoyment of fundamental human rights as a result of the intervention of the
34
African Charter.
Furthermore, the provisions of Article 62 oblige states to report on
the implementation of all the rights and freedoms recognized in the Charter. 35 Reporting under the Charter therefore entails providing information
on a very wide range of rights and freedoms and is bound to be an arduous
task. In fact, a good report under the Charter is as time and resource consuming as the preparation of all six reports to the UN treaty bodies put
together. This, arguably, could create the perception that reporting is too
heavy an obligation and may discourage African states from reporting to the
Commission in the face of their meager resources.
Thus, a mechanism must be found to lighten the burden of reporting
in Africa. Advisedly, one may suggest that the Charter draw on the experience of the HRC, where the latter requests states to submit subsequent reports on issues of concern on a thematic basis. If, for instance, the right to
equality of peoples is an area of concern for the Commission, the Commission may call upon the state concerned to report on the implementation of
Article 19 of the Charter. 36 The Commission may also limit a state's reporting requirements to a specific problem area faced by that party. The advantage of this approach is that, apart from substantially reducing the reporting
burden, it enables the Commission to specifically scrutinize the level of
implementation and difficulties encountered in the particular area selected
for examination. Focused as it is, a thematic approach also helps avoid
evasive reporting and enables the Commission to deeply appraise the state's
performance in a shorter period of time.
ILB

Periodicity of Reporting

The reporting period stipulated under the Charter is one of the most
important distinctions between the Charter and the UN instruments. The
drafters of the Charter set the reporting period at once every two years. In
contrast, the UN instruments provide for longer periods. Under the ICCPR,
a state party is required to submit its first report "[w]ithin one year of the
entry into force of the ...Covenant for the States parties concerned"3 7 and
Hansungule, supra note 14, at 5.
The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 62.
36 Id. at art. 19 ("All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and
shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by
another.").
17 ICCPR, supra note 12, at art. 40.
14
15
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"[t]hereafter whenever the Committee so requests."38 The phrase "whenever the Committee so requests" was translated into the duty to submit periodic reports every five years. In comparison, the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment3 9
(CAT) sets a reporting period at four years and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child 4° (CRC) provides for a reporting period of five years.
The fact that each contracting party has to appear before the treaty body at
regular intervals has the advantage of impartiality as no government will be
41
summoned before the supervisory body as a suspect.
Given the economic capacity of African states and the shortage of
trained personnel, the two year period is too ambitious and too idealistic for
states to comply with. It is interesting to note that under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 42 (ICESCR), the exam-

ining Committee found that the submission of reports every two years was
unduly burdensome. 43 In the context of the European Social Charter, however, a contrary argument has been advanced:
A conscience that speaks every two years is less easily ignored than one that will not come again for another six.
Although there would have been some reduction in the
work load of the contracting parties, it would have been
sufficient to have outweighed the harmful effect of an essentially six-year cycle. 44
This may be sufficient for European countries that have better economic
capacities and long-standing experience with reporting and monitoring.
However, in the African context "the two years reporting obligation is problematic to most State parties. '45 Considered in the light of African states'
Id.
G.A. Res. 36/46, at art. 19(1), U.N. Doe. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter
CAT].
38

39
40
41

G.A. RES. 44/25, AT ART. 44(l)(B), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
V. Dimitrijevic, State Reports, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAKOB TH. MOLLER 193 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001).
42 ICESCR, supra note 12.
43 See ASTRID DANIELSEN, THE STATE REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE AFRiCAN CHARTER 9 (1994).
44 David Harris, Lessons From the Reporting System of the European Social
MECHANISMS:

Charter,in

THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING

Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
45 Hansungule, supra note 14, at 5.

348 (Philip
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reporting burden to various UN bodies, and taking into account the wide
range of efforts a state has to make in the drafting of a report on all the
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter, the two year period is so short
46
as to hinder compliance with the reporting obligation under the Charter.
A more realistic periodicity is necessary and an amendment of the Charter's
periodicity to that effect is, therefore, imperative.
II. C

The Need for Urgent Inter-sessional Reports: A Proposal

Although, arguably, "the reporting system ... [is] the best available
means of overseeing the implementation of human rights obligations,"' 47 this
system may also be described as "unduly passive. ' 48 The traditional pattern
of the reporting system is a cyclical mechanism in which states report at
fixed intervals depending upon the periodicity of the treaty concerned. It
has not been able to address emergency situations involving gross and systematic human rights violations that may occur within the states, and leaves
much to be desired in this respect. The system "has compelled treaty bodies to behave, in situations where allegations of massive human rights violations were made, as if nothing has happened and wait for years until the
'49
time for the submission of the report was due."
Embarrassed by their inability to play any role in the emergency
50
situations that threatened the populations of many countries of the world,
the UN treaty bodies have developed innovative approaches. In this regard,
"[t]he 1990s have been years of innovation,"'51 as the decade witnessed a
new activism of the treaty bodies towards greater effectiveness of the reporting procedure. It was realized that the system of state reporting could
play an active role outside the bounds of its cyclical period, hence the introduction of urgent inter-sessional state reports.
The three years' periodicity provided for under the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, at art. 43(1)(a)-(b), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49
(1990) is indicative of the recent realization on the part of African states that a
longer and more realistic periodicity is necessary.
47 Jane Connors, An Analysis and Evaluation of the System of State Reporting, in
THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000).
48 Dimitrijevic, supra note 41, at 193.
46

49

Id.

50 The crises of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and
Burundi are but a few examples.
51 Michael 0' Flaherty, Treaty Bodies Responding to States of Emergency: The
Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in THE FUTURE OF UN TREATY MONITORING 439
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
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This urgent inter-sessional mechanism applies on an ad hoc basis to
examine reports on human rights situations in particular countries or thematically on human rights violations committed in a specific country. 52 It is
a means of early warning and prevention of irreparable harm in the state
concerned, thereby playing the preventive role of reporting. Thus, it has
been described as "a pioneering intrusion" 53 by treaty bodies into the realm
of state sovereignty. Accordingly, the UN treaty bodies have resorted to
calling upon states to report on human rights situations which require immediate attention.
In April 1992, the HRC addressed to the governments of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia an urgent request to submit specific thematic reports on the implementation of Articles 6,7,9, 10, 12 and
20 of the ICCPR that appeared to have been massively violated in the territories concerned. 54 These requests came before the deadline for initial reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and only seven months after
the third periodic report of Yugoslavia had been considered. 55 The HRC
has amended its Rules of Procedure 56 to empower its Chairperson, acting in
consultation with other members, to request a report in the case of an ex57
ceptional situation that occurs when the Committee is not in session.
By the end of 1999, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination had invoked the procedure with regard to 17 state
parties and had considered the reports. Similarly, the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW
Committee) and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) have introduced the procedure for urgent reports and the CRC
58
Committee has decided to follow suit.
Lyal S. Sunga, The Special Procedures of the UN Commission on Human
Rights: Should They Be Scrapped?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAKOB TH. MOLLER 233 (Gudmundur
Alfredsson et al. eds., 2001).
53 Nigel S. Rodley, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights: Complementarity or Competition?,
25 HUM. RTS. Q. 882 (2003).
54 Dimitrijevic, supra note 41, at 194.
55 Id.
56 ICCPR, Human Rights Committee, Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights
52

Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.6 (Apr. 24, 2001), available at http://www.
unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.C.3.Rev.6.En?Opendocument.
57 Id. at Rule 3.
58 Dimitrijevic, supra note 41, at 194.
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The consideration of these reports led, inter alia, to the issuing of
concluding observations, bringing the situation to the attention of the Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Secretary-General, the
the relevant
General Assembly or the Security Council, and undertakings by
59
Committee.
Cooperation
Technical
or
Good Offices Mission
Despite the recurrence of gross and systematic human rights violations in Africa,60 the Charter neither explicitly nor implicitly provided for
urgent inter-sessional state reports. This should not come as a surprise in the
circumstances where provisions dealing with the cyclical reporting procedure itself are so terse as to omit important aspects requisite for an effective
reporting mechanism. Additionally, there has been no attempt on the part
of the Commission to creatively enable itself to introduce the urgent reporting system. As was the case with the mandate to examine reports under
Article 62, the Commission could call for the Assembly to mandate it as per
Article 45(4) of the Charter to request, receive and examine urgent reports
and to issue concluding observations. The Commission should follow the
example of the CEDAW Committee which requested, received and examined urgent reports from Rwanda at the beginning of its genocide in
1994.
The utility of the system of urgent reports as a means of early warning and prevention cannot be called into question. Undoubtedly, prevention
is better than cure in terms of the material and human cost engendered. 6 1 It
is important that the Commission work with and report to the Assembly,
which has the right to intervene in instances of apparent human rights violations. 62 Given the recurrence of a series of serious and massive human
rights violations in Africa, and the possibility of the AU's intervention in
member states, it is highly possible that the urgent reports mechanism could
play a crucial role in reinvigorating the benefits that may be achieved
through the reporting procedure. It is, therefore, a mechanism worthy of
adoption by the Commission.

59

Id.

60

Rwanda, Algeria, Sierra Leone and Liberia are examples.

61

Hans Thoolen, Early Warning, in INTERNATIONAL

MECHANISMS:

HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING

ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAKOB TH. MOLLER

31 (Gudmundur Alfred-

sson et al. eds., 2001).
62
Constitutive Act of the African Union, at art. 4(h), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15,
entered intoforce May 26, 2001, available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/keyoau/auact.htm [hereinafter the Act] (reserving "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity").

2006

BEYOND THE PROMISES
III.

THE STATE REPORTING MECHANISM UNDER THE CHARTER:
THE PRACTICE OF THE ACTORS

The responsibility for making the reporting procedure effective lies
with a multiplicity of parties or actors. An appraisal of the effectiveness of
the procedure must thus address the question of whether all the actors involved in the process have sufficiently played their parts. The level of introspection and inspection achieved, the contribution of the procedure
towards cultivating the human rights culture, and the preventive role played
by the procedure are among the indispensable considerations needed to
evaluate reporting mechanisms.
III.A

Submission and Presentationof Reports: Towards Introspection

The compliance of a state with its reporting obligations has various
dimensions. The most fundamental of these is its willingness to draft and
submit reports as required by the various treaties in accordance with the
periodicity they establish. And "[t]he obvious case of non-compliance exists when the State party fails to submit the report. '63 Without submission
of reports, the procedure "cannot even get off the ground if the State does
not meet its basic obligations under the Charter." 64 Obviously, "[t]he
eleven Commissioners cannot do much without states carrying out their obligations under the Charter, [and] facilitating the work of the Commission. '65 Evaluation of a state's compliance with the reporting obligation
also involves the submission of adequately self-reflective reports and the
presentation of the same by a qualified delegation.
III.A.1

Back to Basics

III.A. L.a

Failure to Submit or Late Submission of Reports

The failure to submit and the late submission of reports have been
chronic problems plaguing the reporting procedure of the Charter and the
ultimate work of the Commission. As the Charter entered into force on
October 21, 1986, the month of October 1988 marked the first deadline for
reporting. However, none of the 26 initial members had submitted their
63

Dimitrijevic, supra note 41, at 192.

64 Malcom Evans, Tokunbo Ige & Rachel Murray, The Reporting Mechanism of

the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986-2000 36, 37 (Malcorn Evans & Rachel Murray eds. 2002).
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reports by this date. 66 A decade later, i.e., by the 20th Session of the Commission, only the first reports of 16 of the then 51 state parties 67 had been
examined, and 45 second reports were outstanding. 68 At that stage, no state
69
had submitted a third, fourth or fifth report, which were already due.
The situation continued to deteriorate, and "[b]y the 25th Session
there were over 200 state reports due."'70 By the 26th Session, only 24 of
the 53 state parties had reported at all and there were more than 225 reports
overdue. 71 By April 2001, 23 states had not submitted any reports at all, 18
states had submitted only an initial report, and 11 states had submitted a
subsequent report. 72 As a result:
[by] April 2001 the fifty-three State parties to the Charter
should have submitted a total of 301 reports between them
but only forty-one had actually been submitted. Three
states were at least four years behind in the submission of
reports, nine were at least six years behind, one was at least
eight years behind and sixteen were at least ten years
73
behind.
By May 2003, there were 20 states that had never submitted any
Consequently, Hansungule has sarcastically divided African
states into different categories based on their reporting records. 75 "Epileptic
reporters" are those states that reported once and then bolted for the rest of
the ensuing period, to reappear unexpectedly at another time, just like the
disease epilepsy. 76 "Permanent defaulters" are those states that never bothreports. 74

66

See AFRICAN

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, STATUS ON SUB-

MISSION OF STATE PERIODIC REPORTS TO THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
AND PEOPLES'

RIGHTS,

en.html [hereinafter

at http://www.achpr.org/english/info/status-submission_

STATUS ON SUBMISSION].

The reports of South Africa and Swaziland were not yet due at that stage, as
these states had acceded to the Charter for a period less than two years.
68 See STATUS ON SUBMISSION, supra note 66.
69 Id.
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74 See STATUS ON SUBMISSION, supra note 66.
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ered to comply with treaty obligations. 7 Between these extremes one can
find many states whose reports trickle in at irregular intervals.
The problem associated with the reporting record is not only the
failure to submit, but also the late or irregular submission of reports. To
date, only one state has submitted a timely report.7 8 Thus, the non-compliance of African states with their reporting obligation is most unsatisfactory
and the reporting system is facing an "implementation crisis ... of danger'79
ous proportions.
The Charter's two year reporting period is too short and idealistic,
and it is therefore an obstacle to compliance. States are increasingly becoming parties to multiple regional and universal treaties. States claim to
be overexerted and overwhelmed from the reporting obligations under the
treaties.8 0 To make things worse, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families8 ' and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 82 have
come into effect with their respective reporting obligations and monitoring
83
bodies.
Clearly, states do not take their reporting obligations seriously.
There is a lack of political will to report8 4 and it is therefore not a government priority.8 5 Lack of expertise and other resources is another obstacle.
A lack of appreciation of the benefits of reporting contributes to the
problem.
Some states, especially the so-called epileptic reporters, argue that
the Commission's public examination process is unfriendly and gives
NGOs the opportunity to attack states, making states feel targeted.8 6 But
77
78

Id.
See

STATUS ON SUBMISSION,

supra note 66. South Africa's first report was due

on Sept. 7, 1998 and it submitted the report by Oct. 14 of that same year. However,
subsequent reports from the country are overdue.
79 Connors, supra note 47, at 21.
80 Hansungule, supra note 14, at 14.
81 G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. AIRES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990) [hereinafter Migrant Convention].
82 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999 [hereinafter African Charter on
the Rights and Welfare of the Child].
83 Migrant Convention, supra note 81, at art. 73(1); African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child, supra note 82, at art. 43(1)(b).
84 See Mugwanya supra note 25, at 278; Quashigah supra note 3, at 274.
85 Heyns and Viljoen, supra note 6, at 23.
86 Hansungule, supra note 14, at 14.
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this argument's validity is debatable as the reporting records of African
states to UN treaty-bodies, where NGOs could not take the floor and directly react to states' reports, are equally poor. Statistically, African states
account for the largest percentage of overdue reports to UN treaty-bodies in
relation to every treaty, accounting for an average of 38% of all overdue
reports. 87 By any standard, African states are failing the minimal reporting
obligations expected of them under Article 62 of the Charter. The trend
does not show any signs of improvement.
III.A.1.b

The Quality of Reports
Minimal information may be sufficient to determine that the report
is present, but not that it is satisfactory. The completeness of the information contained in each report is as important as the submission of the report
itself. This, in turn, depends on the specific nature of the report prescribed
by the relevant human rights treaty.
Under the Charter, a complete report must incorporate information
on legislative and other measures taken by a reporting state to implement
the whole range of rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter.8 8 Besides,
the reports should be substantive, containing sufficiently accurate information for the Commission to conduct an examination. However, to date, the
reports submitted to the Commission have been brief and "were not the
product of serious introspection, but rather the formalistic fulfillment of
what was regarded as a bureaucratic obligation." 89
The initial Libyan report, for instance, admitted no difficulties in its
human rights record. "Going by its human rights report," writes Hansungule, "Libya has the best record of human rights in the world." 90 The
much-delayed initial report of Nigeria contained six pages, of which three
pages were a photocopy of the table of contents of the partially suspended
Constitution. "[T]he report sounded like Nigeria was a heaven;" 91 the presenter parried all the allegations of human rights abuses, and pointed out
that Nigeria had the best record on press freedom on the African continent
as well as unequalled judicial independence. 92 It is interesting to note that
87

Anne F. Bayefsky, The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the

Crossroads4 Kluwer L. Int'l (2001), availableat http://www.bayefsky.com/report/
finalreport.php.
88 The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 62.
Viljoen, supra note 4, at 242.
90 Hansungule, supra note 14, at 16.
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this report was presented at a time when numerous allegations had been
leveled against Nigeria for the ouster of the jurisdiction of the regular
93
courts, thereby interfering with the independence of the judiciary.
The same was true of the initial report of Sudan, which admitted no
atrocities. 94 The problems of freedom of religion, other human rights
abuses and war in the country were presented in the report in such a way
that made the perpetrators appear to be victims. 95 As regards Chad, the
report contained one and a half pages, which prompted the ever-diplomatic
Commission to decline to examine the report until additional information
was provided. Similarly, Ghana's five and a half page initial report failed
to provide information on specific rights and the difficulties encountered in
giving effect to the rights provided for in the Charter and was silent on
practical steps taken to give effect to the Charter. The 1991 report of
Tanzania was confined to an explanation of legislative measures and failed
to address the practical effects of the measures and the difficulties encountered in giving effect to the Charter. It did not refer whatsoever to economic, social and cultural rights. According to Viljoen, such reports
indicate a lack of commitment on the part of the states and constitute "an
'96
insult to the Commission.
One may surmise that various factors contribute to the submission
of poor quality reports. The Guidelines are too complex and detailed for
states to follow and the Commission itself is lenient as to the necessity of
adhering to the Guidelines. Dissatisfied with similar reporting problems,
1993), available at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/achpr/sess 13-complete.htm
#Nigeria [hereinafter Examination of State Reports].
93 To mention a few: Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 60/91 (1995); The Constitutional
Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
Comm. No. 87/93 (1995); Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 101/93 (1995).
94 The report was submitted at the time when concerns of gross human rights
violations prompted the Commission in 1996 to send a mission to Sudan. Later,
the Commission found that Sudan had been in violation of the Charter's rights,
particularly the right to life (art. 4), the right to dignity (art. 5), the right to liberty
and security of a person (art. 6), the right to a fair trial and to appeal (art. 7),
independence of the judiciary (art. 26), freedom of conscience and free practice of
religion (art. 8), the right to express and disseminate one's opinions (art. 9), and the
right to free association (art. 10). See Amnesty Int'l and Others v. Sudan, African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/
93 (1999).
95 Hansungule, supra note 14, at 17.
96 See Viljoen, supra note 24, at 95.
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the HRC adopted the practice of issuing General Comments to guide government officials involved in the drafting process. 97 The Commission has
not developed any comparable procedure.
Nevertheless, at times, the Commission has received some qualitatively better reports. In relation to the latest submissions from Algeria, The
Gambia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa and Zimbabwe,
98
the Commission expressed its satisfaction with the quality of the reports.
While it is hoped that this is the beginning of a consistent trend of good
reports from state parties, commentators have warned that the Commission's praise of the quality of the reports may mask other problems. According to Viljoen:
[t]he danger is that the Commission may react positively to
a rather imperfect report, just because it shines in comparison with totally inadequate precedents. It may also be
blinded by the comparatively good quality of the report and
lose sight of the inherently poor human rights record of the
country in question. 99
Accordingly, the general picture of the qualitative value of the state
reports to the Commission is poor. As a result, they contribute very little, if
at all, towards the cultivation of a human rights culture on the continent.
III.A.2

The Presentation of Reports

The timely submission of reports is only the first requisite element
for the effective functioning of the reporting process. The next element
concerns the presentation and discussion of that report. In order for a constructive dialogue to be fruitful, it is essential that not only the delegates of
the reporting state be present, but also that the delegation be able to respond
to all the questions posed during the examination of the report. The Commission has faced serious problems with the latter, as with the former. Not
only do many states fail to send representatives to present the reports already submitted, but even when the delegation is present their ability to
engage in a dialogue turns out to be questionable.
Michael O'Flaherty, The Reporting Obligation Under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Lessons to Be Learned From Consideration by the Human Rights Committee of Ireland'sFirst Report, 16 HUM. RTS.
97
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The Seychelles, the "most persistent offender to date," 100 submitted
its first report in 1994101 but has failed to send its representative despite
repeated reminders from the Commission. The Chairperson of the Commission, Commissioner Dankwa, paid a promotional visit to the Seychelles
in 2001 with the specific purpose of persuading the state to send delegates
to present the report, which the county promised but failed to do. 10 2 Chad
submitted its report in 1997103 but failed to send a representative until the
25th Session in 1999. The reports of Cape Verde, Nigeria and Togo were
not examined at the 12th Session since there were no representatives present from these states. Similarly, the representatives of Mauritius and
Mozambique were absent from the 17th Session. The report of
Mozambique was considered only at the 19th Session and that of Mauritius
at the 20th Session. The examination of the reports submitted by Ghana
and Namibia had to be postponed because representatives did not attend the
Sessions at which their reports were due to be considered (the 27th Session
10 4
in April 2000 and the 28th Session in October 2000, respectively).
The absence of representatives from reporting states has resulted in
the Commission's deferral of the examination of the reports. This means
that in some cases, as in that of the Seychelles, the human rights situation
might have considerably changed between the submission of the reports and
their presentation to such an extent that the report may be outdated and may
no longer reflect the current situation in the particular country.
On several occasions, the Commission has stated that it will examine reports at subsequent sessions if states fail to send their representatives. 1 5 But the Commission has failed to follow through with this threat.
In contrast, UN treaty-body Committees, particularly those of the HRC and
10 6
the CESCR, have insisted on examination even in the states' absence.
Representatives, even when present, lack the ability to engage in
constructive dialogue with the Commission which is "dependent on two
100 Evans, Ige & Murray, supra note 64, at 42.
See STATUS ON SUBMISSION, supra note 66.
102 Interview with E.V.O. Dankwa, Chairperson of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights (Sept. 13, 2003).
103 See STATUS ON SUBMISSION, supra note 66.
104 Evans, Ige & Murray, supra note 64, at 42.
105 For comments from Commissioners Kisanga and Janneh, see Examination of
State Reports, supra note 92.
106 International Human Rights Instruments, Report of the Working Methods of the
Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting Process, U.N.
Doc. HRIJMC/2005/4 (May 25, 2005), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G05/422/35/PDF/G0542235.pdf?OpenElement.
101
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communicating partners who are able to enter into discussion about issues
with which both of them are familiar and about which both are able to
express opinions."' 1 7 It is significant that the Assembly recommended that
the state parties designate high ranking officials capable of acting "as focal
points in the relation between the Commission and the States as such...
focal points would facilitate the follow-up on the Commission's recommendations and contact between States and the Commission."'10 8 Thus, the prerequisite here is "a synthesis of 'influence' and 'legal expertise.' "109
It is unfortunate that "most frequently states designate either a high
ranking (political) figure not sufficiently conversant with the legal issues, or
a legal expert devoid of any potential impact in the higher echelons of government," 10 and indeed, this has been the case from the examination of the
first state report where Libya sent its ambassador to present. Apart from
very rare exceptions, representatives of states "have not always possessed
the requisite qualifications which would enable them to have a constructive
dialogue with the Commission.""' 1 In some cases, officials who made the
presentation had not participated in the drafting of the reports and were not
12
fully conversant with the subject.'
Thus, under the circumstances, the reporting system yields very little by way of inspection and introspection in the absence of effective presentation of the reports and dialogue with the Commission. When viewed
from the standpoint of the states' performance, the state reporting procedure
is in a precarious position and is in need of renewed commitment from state
parties.
III.B

The Role of the Commission: Gauging the Level of Inspection

Although the timely submission by state parties of accurate and
complete reports and the presentation of the reports in a balanced and open
fashion are indispensable ingredients for the efficacy of the reporting procedure, they are not sufficient to make the system effective. The system remains ineffective if the forms of scrutiny to which the reports are subjected
107
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109 Viljoen, supra note 24, at 99.
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are perfunctory or ill-informed. The degree of inspection conducted by the
Commission is a controlling factor and is at the heart of the process.
III.B.1

Guidelines for Reporting

Following the authorization it received from the Assembly, the
Commission adopted the Guidelines for state reporting so as to "ensure that
the reports are made in a uniform manner, [to] reduce the need for the Commission requesting additional information and for it to obtain a clearer picture of the situation"" 3 in the reporting state. Unfortunately, the Guidelines
adopted by the Commission were "complex, repetitive and lengthy."' 14 According to Viljoen, this "creates a perception that reporting is burdensome
and it has certainly been a factor inhibiting swift compliance"1' 15 of states
with their duty to report under Article 62 of the Charter. The Commission
itself has realized that the Guidelines are "too lengthy and probably serve as
16
a disincentive to ... states to report on their human rights conditions."'
Additionally, the organization and structure of the Guidelines are
difficult to follow. Initial and periodic reports are repeatedly discussed
under each subject, such that a report on a section of the Guidelines appears
to be a complete report in its own right. Initial reports and subsequent reports are to be submitted on different occasions; moreover, the former deals
with similar information from every state and is to be submitted only once
by any one state. The repeated discussion of the initial report under each
heading is redundant, if not bad drafting. It would be more practical to
have separate sections on initial reports and periodic reports, describing the
information required in relation to specific rights and duties in the Charter.
Furthermore, the Guidelines do not follow the order of specific
rights enshrined in the Charter. There is not unanimous agreement on the
thematic method used to categorize rights into families. Opinions differ as
to whether a particular right belongs to one cluster of rights rather than
another. For example, the right of individuals to take part in cultural life is
inherent in the individual under Article 17,17 however the Guidelines address the right as a people's right. In order to avoid such confusions, the
113
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Guidelines should be amended to cover the Charter on a right-by-right
basis.
Mindful of these difficulties, in 1998 the Commission came up with
a short, severely abbreviated 11 point guideline. This guideline has been
invariably criticized as "brief to the point of being vacuous." ' Thus, it has
failed to inform and guide states on the concise information needed and
how it should be presented. Further, the relationship between the former
and the latter guidelines is far from clear. The question of whether the latter
repeals the former is left unanswered and, as such, creates confusion. 1 9
Nevertheless, neither of the guidelines has prompted compliance and the
1 20
practice of states' reports lies somewhere between the two.
The two sets of guidelines have common weaknesses. Both are silent on the role and participation of NGOs in the process of preparation and
presentation of state reports and follow-up. There is a lack of any form of
concluding observations or comments in both guidelines. They are silent as
to the quality of state parties' delegations and the need to update the reports
with facts that have occurred subsequent to the submission of the report but
before its consideration. The lesson is that a shorter, comprehensive, and
user-friendly guideline covering all rights is a necessity.
III.B.2

Absence and Inadequacy of Government Representatives

As stated previously, the absence of a reporting state's representatives at the examination of a report has always caused the deferral of the
examination of the report concerned. While this has become one of the
major obstacles to the timely examination of reports, thereby causing examination backlog, there is little that the Commission can do to alleviate the
problem. The Commission issues resolutions and sends reminders to the
states concerned to call upon them to submit and present reports. Commissioners also raise the matter on their promotional missions. For instance, as
previously mentioned, the Chairperson of the Commission was mandated to
go to the Seychelles in 2001 to ensure that a delegate would present the
report at the session following the visit. Yet, the Commission's efforts have
been met with little success, if any. Poor presentation of reports by government representatives is still another problem.
In dealing with the lack of attendance and inadequacy of government representatives, the Commission has always been ambivalent and has
failed to take decisive action. The possibility of examination of state re118 Evans, Ige & Murray, supra note 64, at 45.
119 Id.
120

Id.
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ports in the absence of representatives was suggested at the 9th Session but
no conclusive decision was made. The issue of considering a report in the
absence of government representative came up once again at the 13th Session when Benin failed to send a representative despite reminders from the
Commission. The issue is still awaiting the Commission's decision.
Earlier debates on the issue have led to disagreement among the
Commissioners. Commissioner Badawi, referring to "'compelling logic'
dictated by the 'spirit and the sense of the exercise of discussing the report,' "121 argued that "the consideration of state reports 'is a process which
involves the presence of the state, establishing a dialogue with the
state.' "122 In disagreement, Commissioner Umozurike rightly argued that
the Charter does not require the presence of a state's representative. 123 The
Rules of Procedure (Rules) merely "authorise' '1 24 the reporting state's representative to "participate in a specific Session" 125 and, as such, the presence
of a state's representative is not a prerequisite for the examination of the
reports.
The need for conducting a constructive dialogue dictates the examination of the report in the presence of a representative. Equally, the needs
to compel defaulting states to attend the Commission's sessions, to prevent
backlog, and to consider a report before the information contained in the
report becomes outdated, require the Commission to examine reports even
in the absence of a representative of the reporting state. In contrast to the
Commission's current practice, the UN treaty bodies, especially the HRC
and the CESCR, do examine a report when a state fails to send a
representative.
Another controversial issue awaiting resolution is the inadequacy of
the state representatives. The Rules provide that "representative[s] should
be able to reply to questions put to him/her by the Commission and make
statements on reports already submitted by this State."' 126 The HRC's
guidelines require that the state party's delegation should include persons
who, "through their knowledge of and competence to explain the human
rights situation in that State, are able to respond to the Committee's written
and oral questions and comments concerning the whole range of Covenant
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rights." 127 Advisedly, the Commission should adopt this approach and it
should comment on the adequacy of representatives in concluding
28
observations. 1
III.B.3 Dealing with the Failure to Submit or the Late Submission of
Reports
The problems of the failure to submit and late submission have
been identified and the situation is worsening rather than showing progress.
Whereas the Guidelines are silent on what to do under such circumstances,
the Rules allow the Commission to send a reminder to the state party concerned and, in the event the state fails to submit a report, to point this out to
129
the General Assembly of the OAU/AU.
The Guidelines do not provide for the consideration of a state's
human rights situation in the absence of a report, and neither does the Commission, in practice. It is noted that
[t]he consideration of a state in the absence of a report, has
a different set of goals, including:
a) encouraging the production of a report in the
future
b) highlighting the states' record of compliance for
the international community and providing an
international forum for a human rights review in
the absence of a national arena
c) producing a set of recommendations which
might encourage reform
d) equal treatment of ratifying parties to the
treaty.

130

The experience of the UN treaty bodies shows that "[s]tates do send
delegations to engage in a dialogue with the committee in the absence of a
report when their states' record is scheduled."' 131 This certainly results in
UN Human Rights Committee, Consolidated Guidelines for State Reports
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at G.3, CCPR,/C/
127

66/GUI/Rev.2 (Feb. 26, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/

(symbol)/CCPR.C.66.GUI.Rev.2.En?Opendocument.
128 One may attribute the high quality of Zimbabwe's presentation of its second
report to the express disapproval by some Commissioners, notably Commissioner
Nguema, of the poor presentation of its initial report.
129 Rules, supra note 124, at Rules 81, 84-85.
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some form of dialogue, and limited dialogue is better than none. A recommendation coming out of such consideration "can serve as [a] vehicle[ ] for
constructive change through actors at the national level."' 13 2 Equally important, "[a] perception of equal treatment of states parties encourages those
'
states which do report to continue to take the process seriously."133
Thus,
the Commission needs to adopt this procedure if the failure to submit and
the late submission of reports are to be discouraged. For that purpose, the
Commission may be assisted by NGOs and may access the state's recent
report to UN treaty bodies, if any.
III.B.4

Failure of Appointed Commissioners to Attend

The Commission's modus operandi is such that a Commissioner is
assigned beforehand as a Special Rapporteur and then drafts questions for
the state to address. At the examination stage, the Special Rapporteur leads
the discussion, although other Commissioners also ask questions. The absence of the Special Rapporteur disrupts the examination process as he is
expected to familiarize himself with the report and ask very probing
questions.
There have been instances when the Special Rapporteur's absence
gave rise to serious difficulties. At the 9th Session, Commissioners Ndiaye
and Beye, who were to act as Special Rapporteurs, did not attend the Session. No substitute had been appointed and the state report had not been
made available to the Commissioners before the Session. Further, the state
reports had not been translated into the working languages of the Commission. Thus, Commissioner Nguema had to prepare two state reports overnight. At the 12th Session, Commissioner Mokama was the Special
Rapporteur for the initial report of Zimbabwe but he could not attend the
Session. Commissioner Kisanga had to take over at very short notice.
III.B.5

The Nature of the Dialogue: Questions and Responses

The stage at which the Commission poses questions and makes its
observations to state representatives is "the core of the examination process."' 13 4 "The types of questions asked and observations made by the Commission can have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the
examination process"' 135 and, in fact, it is the essential peg upon which constructive dialogue can be hung.
132
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However, the quality of the dialogue during the Commission's examination of state reports has been marred by numerous obstacles. In many
instances, the Special Rapporteur received the report only shortly before the
examination and thus found it difficult to familiarize himself with the contents of the report. 136 Furthermore, in most cases the Secretariat has failed
to translate the reports into the Commission's working languages. Thus,
those Commissioners who do not understand the language in which the report has been submitted are effectively eliminated from active participation
in the discussion. The inadequate presentation of reports by government
representatives has again weakened the dialogue.
The nature of the dialogue itself "has so far tended to be subdued." 13 7 According to Commissioner Nguema, the representatives have
been handled with too much deference and respect. He commented, "I
thought we should engage in a dialogue, in other words we should not treat
[the state representatives] as diplomats but rather as technicians of law that
138
should be able on technical issues to elicit the responses.
The questions put to the state representatives have in many instances been too general and diplomatic, partly due to the relative lack of
independence on the part of the Commissioners. The 11 member Commission is presumably composed of state party nationals "chosen from amongst
African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and peoples'
rights."' 13 9 Although they are nominated and elected by state parties, they
are supposed to "serve in their personal capacity,"' 140 and not as government
representatives. Consequently, the Commissioners should be independent
and impartial and, thus, be free from improper influences and biases.
In many instances, the practice relating to the composition of the
Commission is at odds with expectations and at variance with Article 31 of
136

A classical example is the case of Nigeria's state report. The Rapporteur, Com-

missioner Janneh, said:
I am the Rapporteur and it is madness really, because I have just
I hope that all Commisbeen given this for the first time ....
sioners will join in asking quite a few questions. I would have
been very happy if I had gotten this document earlier. But we
cannot let the ambassador go without dealing with the report.
Examination of State Reports, supra note 92.
137 Frans Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
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1998 189, 190 (C. Heyns ed. 2001).
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The Charter, supra note 1, at art. 31(1).
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the Charter. Some Commissioners hold ministerial or ambassadorial positions or are Attorney Generals. This has been a source of conflict and confusion that affects their ability to function as independent experts. Thus, it
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an individual holding such a
position in government to act concurrently as an independent member of a
body that is to hold the same government accountable for its actions.
Even where the concerned Commissioners are actually free and independent in discharging their duties, outsiders are given a different impression. Referring to the composition of a Nigerian Special Tribunal, the
Commission itself commented that "[r]egardless of the character of the individual members of such tribunals, its composition alone creates the appearance, if not actual lack, of impartiality." 14 1 The same can be said of the
Commission.
Additionally, the factor of time is a major problem contributing to
the subdued nature of the dialogue. Compared to other international moni42
toring bodies, the African Commission dispenses reports quite quickly.
Initially, reports were released in approximately 45 minutes, though a
longer amount of time is now devoted to the matter.
The experience of the HRC shows that one of the most important
ways of establishing a meaningful dialogue between the Committee and
1 43
state representatives is the suspension of proceedings after questions.
The government representative is then given a day to prepare replies. The
Commission could not adopt this procedure perhaps due to its financial
repercussions since the Commission lacks the resources to keep it in session
for more than 15 days at any one meeting.
III.B.6

Lack of Concluding Observations and Follow-Up

Although the Guidelines do not provide for concluding observations, Rule 85(3) of the Procedure empowers the Commission to issue general observations.1 44 In practice, the Commission did not issue concluding
observations until the 29th Session in 2001. This may be partly attributed
to the issue of Commissioners' independence since many would presumably avoid ending the scrutiny of a report with any form of decision, verdict
'41The

Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, 14 Comm. No. 87/93 (1995).
142 Viljoen supra note 4, at 254.
143 O'Flaherty, supra note 97, at 517.
144 Rules, supra note 124, at Rule 85(3) (the Commission "may address all general
observations to the State concerned as it may deem necessary."). Note, however,
that general observations are to be issued only when the "Commission decides that
the State has not discharged some of its obligations under the Charter." Id.
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or even final conclusions. Since the 29th Session, however, concluding observations have become a feature of the Commission's response to the pres145
entation of a state report.
It is of paramount importance to note that concluding observations
are yardsticks by which the Commission can measure the progress between
past and present compliance of a state. Concerns and recommendations that
emerged from the previous reports are to be addressed in subsequent reports, thereby forming the basis for a continuing dialogue and follow up.
Thus:
[a]ny meaningful follow-up remains elusive without observations that could serve as a basis for NGOs to lobby for
improvements domestically, and as a yardstick to the Commission itself when evaluating the next report from that
state.... Such recommendations, contained in "concluding
observations," can serve as clear guidance to the government about how to improve implementation of the African

Charter. 146
Thus, the lack of concluding observations had been a crucial shortcoming
of the examination process of the Commission. This must have partly contributed to the lack of seriousness on the part of the states towards their
reporting obligations under the Charter.
III.B.7

Secretarial Problems

The lack of translation of state reports has been one of "the most
nagging problems" 147at the level of the Secretariat. This has been attributed, inter alia, to inadequacy of human and financial resources. 148 The
Procedure provides for the Secretary to "endeavour to translate all reports
49
and other documents of the Commission into the working languages."'

145

Interview with E.V.O. Dankwa, Chairperson of the African Commission on

Human and Peoples' Rights (Sept. 13, 2003).
146 Viljoen supra note 71, at 117.
147

Viljoen, supra note 4, at 252.

148 ANKUMAH,

supra note 111, at 100 ("This is due to the fact that many reports are

not translated into all three working languages due to the inadequacy of human and
financial resources." ).
149 Rules, supra note 124, at Rule 80. The working languages "shall be, if possible,
African languages, Arabic, English, French and Portuguese." See The Act, supra
note 62, at art. 25.
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The inclusion of the phrase "endeavour" suggests "cognizance of the seem150
ingly insurmountable difficulties presented by reality."'
No French or Arabic translations of the Gambian and Zimbabwean
reports were available at the 12th Session. 151 No English translation of reports was available in the case of Togo's report. 152 The lack of secretarial
efficiency and cooperation in making copies and distributing the updated
report of Zimbabwe to the Commissioners and NGOs prompted the
Zimbabwean ambassador to comment that it was "[m]ost unfortunate that
there seems to be a total lack of communication and management skills.
We do hope that something can be done pretty quickly, because this is a
153
shame on Africa and on the African race.
Likewise, at the 9th Session, where the reports from Tunisia and
Libya were examined, a copy was given only to the Special Rapporteur. On
many occasions only some of the Commissioners had received the reports.
In many instances the commissioners receive reports only on the day of the
examination, and often shortly before the beginning of the session.
III.C The Role of Non-State Actors

Obviously, all stages of the reporting process contribute towards the
achievement of the purposes of reporting. The level of consultation and
self-evaluation during the preparation of the report, the degree of inspection
during examination of the report, and the concluding observations that
emerge from the examination process, together play a pivotal role towards
that end.
NGO participation in the reporting process may occur at four
stages: before submission of a report, following its submission and prior to
its consideration by a treaty body, in the context of its examination by the
treaty body, and following the conclusion of the examination. Before the
submission of the report, ideally, NGOs encourage and pressure states to
submit reports in a timely fashion and assist the state in the drafting
process.
NGOs may disseminate information about the Commission's actions, resolutions and calls for reporting directed to a state with regard to
the reporting duties, and create public awareness about the obligation and
governmental record in this regard. Skillful dissemination and employment
150 Viljoen, supra note 4, at 252.

Commissioner Beye had to apologize in advance for his inability to participate
in the examination of the report. See Examination of State Reports, supra note 92.
151

152

Id.

153

Id.
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of all relevant information by NGOs can do much to encourage tardy states
to meet their reporting obligations. In cases where states lack the technical
expertise to compile reports, NGOs can provide technical cooperation to
assist in overcoming such difficulties. For states facing financial con154
straints, NGO involvement will help to minimize the financial burden.
Moreover, NGOs might contribute to the report drafting process
either by making submissions to the government or by actively participating
in the actual drafting process. Furthermore, they can assist the examining
Commissioners who generally have neither the resources nor the depth of
knowledge of local circumstances to be able to monitor systematically.
Hansungule noted that "[i]t is not possible for Commissioners to be abreast
with every aspect of the human rights situation in a [s]tate party they do not
hail from. ' '15 5 Cognizant of this reality, "the Commission has often invited
NGOs to provide information in advance of a State Party report being
156
considered."
In addition to channeling unofficial reports (also known as shadow
or alternate reports) in confidence to the Commissioners, the NGOs' submissions and interventions during the examination of reports help to identify difficulties overlooked and/or unidentified and to complement the state
report. No matter how good a state report might be, oversights and lacunae
are unavoidable. Thus, there is always room for improving the quality of a
report by channeling independent information to the Commissioners.
Shadow reports can also serve as references against which a state report can
be tested.
Generally, governments do not readily provide a critical analysis of
negative aspects pertaining to human rights protection in their countries. In
such cases, NGOs "keep the system honest when governments and international bureaucrats fail to tell the truth or otherwise become entangled in
diplomatic niceties."' 157 Further, "[t]he fact that states are aware that NGOs
are present and ready to furnish the Commission with information may
check dishonest or incomplete state reporting, besides putting pressure on

supra note 111, at 81.
Hansungule, supra note 14, at 18.
Ahmed Motala, Non-governmental Organizationsin the African System, in THE
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states to remedy violations to avoid embarrassment before the
Commission."15
Moreover, if the Commission is to embark on considering a defaulting state without a report or a representative of a state where states fail to
send one after submitting a report, NGOs help the Commission to have a
deeper insight of the country's human rights situation. In these circumstances, "without NGO information, supervisory bodies would hardly be
able to go about the consideration of states' reports in a meaningful
159
manner."
After the examination of the report, NGOs can pressure the government to respect the recommendations of the Commission, monitor compliance of the state with the Commission's concluding observations, and press
the government to submit timely subsequent report on the progress made in
the interim period. They can locally publicize concerns of the Commission
in relation to the state concerned and provide the Conmmission with information on compliance of the state and the progress made following the
preceding recommendations of the Commission, thereby enabling the Commission to follow-up its own conclusions and recommendations. Furthermore, NGOs can provide financial and secretarial assistance to the everfinancially constrained Commission.
Despite some criticisms directed against the Commission on the
ground of insufficient involvement of NGOs, 160 the Commission has from
time to time established a strong relationship with NGOs. In fact, "from the
11th Session, the Commission started to refer publicly to documentation
and other information presented to them by NGOs."'1 6 1 The Commission
works with NGOs with observer status. The Commission's decision to accord such a status was welcomed by the First OAU Ministerial Conference
on Human Rights in Africa.162 However, secretarial problems at the Commission made it difficult for the NGOs to know of the date of examination
and to get copies of state reports. 63 This precludes effective NGO contribution to the examination process.
158
159

Mugwanya, supra note 25, at 280.
Bert G. Ramcharan, Follow-up of Treaty Body Conclusions by the Treaty Bod-

ies and the UN Mechanisms Beyond, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 277, 282 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed. 2000).
160 Mugwanya, supra note 25, at 280.
161 Viljoen supra note 24, at 99.
162 See OAU Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in Africa, Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, 25 (Apr. 12-16, 1999), available at http://
www.africanreview.org/docs/rights/grandbBay.pdf.
163 Motala, supra note 156, at 260.
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Regrettably, many states ignore NGOs or preclude their involvement in the process of compilation, drafting and submission of a report.
"The Commission has unceasingly asked reporting states not only whether
local NGOs have been informed, but whether these NGOs [have] been invited to take part in the drafting of reports." 164 In Egypt, for instance,
NGOs play no role in the reporting process. 165 Senegal and South Africa
have increasingly involved NGOs in the process of preparing reports and,
166
as such, are exceptions in this respect.

III.D

From OAU to AU: Implications on State Reporting

The principal motive behind the creation of the OAU in 1963 was
not the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent. Its
members states were only required to have due regard to the UN Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 167 In fact, "[n]one of the
five specialist commissions established under Article 20 of the OAU Charter was devoted to human rights."'1 68 Priority was given to the security and
inviolability of states, and efforts were concentrated on "dismantling the
relics of colonialism and fighting apartheid."' 169 Thus, issues of human
rights "in the OAU Charter were considered only in the context of self170
determination and in the ending of colonial rule."'
Nearly 20 years had to elapse before the OAU adopted an instrument solely devoted to the protection of human rights. The adoption of the
Charter in June 1981, and the consequent creation of the Commission and
reporting procedure was a new chapter in its existence. In practice, however, state parties have failed in their reporting obligations. Yet, the OAU
never condemned a country for failing to report to the Commission.
The OAU failed to provide essential human and material resources
to the Commission. For the financial year 1996-1997, for instance, the
budget allocated to the Commission by the OAU was 1.95 percent of its
Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa, Procedures of the African Regional Human Rights System: Workshop Materials 60 (2003).
165 Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 6, at 506.
164

166

Id.

The Charter, supra note 1, at pmbl.
168 Viljoen, supra note 24, at 47.
169 Robert Eno, The Place of the African Commission in the New African Dispensation, 11 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 1 (2002), available at http://www.iss.co.
167
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total annual budget of the year. 17 1 Due to budget limitations, "donor funding is being used to employ key personnel." 172 The Commission also had to
reduce the length of its meetings "as a result of the reduction of its budget
by the OAU Secretariat." 173 Regrettably, the Commission received greater
support from outside sources than from the OAU. 174 Thus:
[t]he Commission has survived on handouts from intergovernmental and non-governmental foreign institutions
....
Financial matters and survival strategies have taken
up substantial spaces at the Commission's bi-annual sessions, instead of the Commission using those limited peri75
ods to deliberate on important aspects of its mandate. 1
Weaknesses in the management and functioning of the Secretariat, provided
by the OAU Secretary-General, had a significant impact on the overall performance of the Commission.
Given such failures of the OAU, it is noted: "it may well turn out
that the transition of the OAU into the AU is as important as the United
Nations replacing the failed League of Nations after World War 11."I76
The Constitutive Act of the AU 177 (Act) expresses member states'
determination to "promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture and to ensure good governance and
the rule of law" 178 in accordance with the Charter and other relevant human
rights institutions. Unlike the OAU Charter which contained limited provi171
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sions on human rights, the Act attaches a particular significance to human
179
rights in a more comprehensive manner.
Organizationally, "[t]he AU is loosely modelled on the European
Union"' 180 in which there has never been a case of a state not submitting a
report. 8 1 In the latter, the administrative and financial conditions and the
fear of sanction or expulsion of recalcitrant states from the membership,
inter alia, contribute to the successes of the procedure. 182 In Africa, there
has not been any mechanism for sanctioning for the failure to report within
the OAU framework. However, the Act introduced a mechanism for sanction. Under Article 23(2):
any Member State that fails to comply with the decisions
and policies of the Union may be subjected to . . . sanc-

tions, such as the denial of transport and communications
links with other Member States, and other measures of a
political and economic nature to be determined by the
Assembly.183
As the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent is
one of the principal policies of the AU, failure of the state to report on its
human rights situation will violate the policies of the AU and may entail
sanctions including expulsion. While this certainly constitutes a progress
over the OAU legal framework, the degree of applicability and the fear it
will engender are yet to be seen in practice.
Notwithstanding these developments, the Act never mentions or expressly incorporates the Commission. The AU incorporated the African
Commission within its framework only in 2002, and it did so through a
resolution.18 4 The proliferation of organs of the AU and its duplication and
financial repercussions are worrisome. Baimu has noted that "the proliferation of human rights institutions could lead to diversion of attention and
179
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Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for Better Protection of Human
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resources allocated to the existing human rights institutions.1 185 In short,
OAU-AU transition has generated both hope and concern in regards to state
reporting.
Nevertheless, through the processes of succession, the AU has replaced the OAU and the Commission is entitled to expect the cooperation
of the AU. 8 6 It is required under Article 45(1)(C) of the Charter to "cooperate with other African and international institutions concerned with the
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights."'1 87 Hence, the
88
Commission must work with the relevant organs of the AU.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND A WAY FORWARD

This study shows that the state reporting procedure under the Charter is facing an implementation crisis of dangerous proportions and is
marred by many problems. Thus, a single solution will not cure all the ills
of the system and a single-causal explanation of the situation is extremely
inadequate.
The reporting performance of states reveals an embarrassing failure. Many of them have failed to submit a single report to date, only one
state has submitted a timely report, and most reports lack introspective
value. Generally, the reports "tend to be descriptive, formalistic, legalistic
and self-congratulatory, rather than reflective and focused on substance and
practical realities, and problems encountered."' 8 9
States' refusals to present their reports to the Commission have led
to deferrals of the consideration of the reports while inadequate presentation
resulted in subdued dialogue, thereby watering down the purposes sought to
be achieved through reporting. The Commission's less probing and more
diplomatic questions have also contributed to the lack of effective dialogue.
The Commission should consider states' human rights performance
even in the absence of states' report and/or representatives. Consideration
of a defaulting state's human rights situation in the absence of a report or of
representatives adds to the Commission's seriousness about reporting, creates the perception of equal treatment of all states, encourages those which
185
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report to continue to do so, and compels the tardy ones into compliance. It
has been correctly argued:
states should not exercise an implicit veto power by refusing to submit reports or to attend meetings .....
.The
Commission has the potential to examine reports, compare
them with its own findings and other available information,
and draw necessary conclusion even in states' absence to
prevent the reporting system from becoming a high-minded
but totally ineffective means of promotion and
protection. 190
The recently emerging trend of issuing concluding observations is
an encouraging start, but secretarial problems and financial constraints preclude the Commission from taking sufficient time to thoroughly discuss the
reports and issue well considered observations. The AU should provide
essential human and material resources to enable the Commission to fulfill
its promotional and protective mandate. The Commission must also continue working with NGOs which could provide it with financial assistance.
Silence relating to the power to issue concluding observations and
the absence of a clear requirement of reporting on progress achieved are
parts of the Achilles' heel of the Charter. Requiring states to report on all
the rights, duties and freedoms at once is too burdensome in the context of
the economic realities of African states. The Commission should be able to
receive periodic thematic reports on a problem area faced by a particular
state rather than requiring states to report on all rights, duties and freedoms.
The two year reporting period is also too ambitious and too idealistic for
state parties to comply with. From the prevailing reporting experiences, the
reporting period under the Charter should be extended to a four year reporting cycle. A mechanism should also be devised whereby the Commission
requires states to submit urgent reports where there seem to be gross and
systematic violations of human rights in the state concerned. Thus, there
are many compelling reasons to amend Article 62 of the Charter.
190 Gerd Oberleitner & Claude E. Welch, Jr., 15th Session of the African Commis-
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